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DOHERTY v. THORNBURGH -
DEPORTABLE ALIENS DETAINED AND




The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects a person's interest in liberty through its guarantee of
due process of law.' All individuals within the United States re-
ceive this constitutional protection regardless of their citizen-
ship.2 In analyzing the substantive due process rights of individ-
uals who are not citizens of the United States, however, the
federal government's plenary control over immigration matters
becomes an additional consideration.' This Comment will ad-
dress the difficulties that arise in determining the point at which
the regulation of immigration by the government impinges upon
the liberty interests of individual aliens.
Congress has enacted laws which permit the detention of
aliens who are unlawfully in the United States.4 These statutes
prescribe a period of time during which the Attorney General
may detain an alien before deportation." Additional procedures
are included which provide discretionary release on bond if the
Attorney General finds it appropriate.6 However, while the
1. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall be
... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
2. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1896); see also Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) ("[E]ven aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have
long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments."); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
3. See infra notes 123-137 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1988). The statute provides, in part: "Pending a
determination of deportability in the case of any alien ... such alien may, upon warrant
of the Attorney General, be arrested and taken into custody." Id.
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1988): "When a final order of deportation under administra-
tive processes is made against any alien, the Attorney General shall have a period of six
months from the date of such order, or, if judicial review is had, then from the date of
the final order of the court, within which to effect the alien's departure from the United
States ......
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1988) provides that an alien arrested under an immigration
warrant and "taken into custody may, in the discretion of the Attorney General and
pending such final determination of deportability, (A) be continued in custody; or (B) be
released under bond in the amount of not less than $500 with security approved by the
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power to expel aliens belongs to the legislative and executive
branches of the government, this power remains "subject to ju-
dicial intervention under the paramount law of the
[C]onstitution. ' '7 The judiciary must intervene when the govern-
ment's implementation of its immigration laws violates the con-
stitutional rights of a deportable alien."
In Doherty v. Thornburgh,9 the Second Circuit reaffirmed
that "aliens do have a substantive due process right to be free of
arbitrary confinement pending deportation proceedings.' 10 The
court nonetheless found that the Fifth Amendment rights of Jo-
seph Doherty, an alleged Irish Republican Army terrorist who
had not been charged with a crime in the United States, had not
been violated by his eight-year confinement." In reaching this
result, the court undervalued the due process protection af-
forded to aliens in light of competing governmental interests.
Attorney General, containing such conditions as the Attorney General may prescribe; or
(C) be released on conditional parole."
Following a final order of deportation, "at the Attorney General's discretion, the
alien may be detained, released on bond in an amount and containing such conditions as
the Attorney General may prescribe, or released on such other condition as the Attorney
General may prescribe" for the six month period, excluding judicial review, in which the
deportation must be effected. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1988).
7. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952). The deportation statute itself pro-
vides for judicial review of the Attorney General's detention decision:
Any court of competent jurisdiction shall have authority to review or revise
any determination of the Attorney General concerning detention, release on
bond, or other release during such six-month period upon a conclusive showing
in habeas corpus proceedings that the Attorney General is not proceeding with
such reasonable dispatch as may be warranted by the particular facts and cir-
cumstances in the case of any alien to effect such alien's departure from the
United States within such six-month period.
8 U,S.C. § 1252(c) (1988). See also Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. granted, Burr v. Flores, 112 S. Ct. 1261 (1992) ("A crucial component of the right to
personal liberty is the ability to test the legality of any direct restraint that the govern-
ment seeks to place on that liberty."); ELLEN GITEL GORDON & CHARLES GORDON, IMM!-
GRATION LAW AND NATIONALITY LAW § 17.03[2] [a] (1992) ("The Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to deportation
proceedings.").
8. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,
793 n.5 (1977) ("Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under
the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate the admission
and exclusion of aliens . . ."); Fernandez-Santander v. Thornburgh, 751 F. Supp. 1007,
1009 (D. Me. 1990) ("The courts' deference to the 'plenary power' of Congress is limited
essentially to Congress's decision regarding who is excludable; it does not extend to their
treatment during the deportation process.").
9. 943 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
10. Id. at 209.
11. Id.
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This Comment analyzes the extent to which substantive due
process should protect aliens who are confined while awaiting
deportation. This Comment proposes a constitutional analysis
which is analogous to the approach used in evaluating the sub-
stantive due process limits on pretrial detention. This test prop-
erly balances the government's interests in controlling immigra-
tion and carrying out its foreign policy with the individual's
interest in being free from prolonged confinement. Thus, the
test must weigh the length of the deportable alien's confinement
and the government's responsibility for any delay against the
risk that the alien will abscond and the special deference given
to the government's decision in light of its unique role as the
maker of foreign policy. Had the Second Circuit applied this
constitutional test to the Doherty case, it would have concluded
that the length of his detention violated his due process rights
under the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, by using a principled
approach, the court would have avoided setting a dangerous pre-
cedent which sanctions indefinite detention of aliens.
II. DOHERTY V. THORNBURGH
A. Facts
Joseph Doherty, a native of Northern Ireland and member
of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), was convicted
of murder in absentia ' by a court in Great Britain in 1981 for
the killing of a British army captain.13 The conviction stemmed
from a confrontation in Northern Ireland between PIRA mem-
bers and British soldiers. 4 Before the court's final decision and
a sentence of life imprisonment, Doherty escaped from the
prison where he was being held. 5 After remaining in hiding in
the Republic of Ireland, he entered the United States in Febru-
ary 1982 using a false passport. 6
In June 1983, federal agents arrested Doherty and charged
him with having entered the United States illegally. He was held
without bail in the Metropolitan Correctional Center, a federal
12. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
13. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d at 205.
14. Id.
15. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. 131, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d
204 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
16. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d at 205. American PIRA sympathizers helped
Doherty obtain false identification, join a union, and gain employment at a Manhattan
bar. Id.
1992]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. [Vol. XVIII:3
pretrial detention center in New York City.17 From that point
onward, Doherty remained in detention throughout separate de-
portation, extradition, bail, and habeas corpus proceedings. 8
Acting on behalf of the United Kingdom,19 the United
States began extradition proceedings against Doherty.20 Doherty
subsequently requested that his deportation proceedings be held
in abeyance.21 In December 1984, the extradition request was
denied because the district court concluded that Doherty's acts
fell within the "political offenses" exception to the extradition
treaty.22 The government unsuccessfully sought collateral review
of the decision.2
Upon resolution of the extradition proceedings in 1986, Do-
herty requested resumption of his deportation proceedings. He
conceded his deportability24 and designated the Republic of Ire-
17. Id.
18. Id. at 205-08. Congress has given the Attorney General the right to keep an alien
in detention pending a final order of deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1988). For the
relevant text of the statute, see supra note 6.
Note that on January 15, 1992, the Supreme Coirt issued a final order of deporta-
tion for Doherty. I.N.S. v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992). Certiorari was dismissed by the
Supreme Court for the present case. Doherty v. Barr, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
19. The government of the United Kingdom sought the extradition on the basis of
Doherty's conviction in Northern Ireland for "murder, attempted murder, and illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition, and for offenses allegedly committed in the
course of his escape from prison." Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
20. Extradition was sought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1990) and the Treaty of
Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty].
21. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d at 206.
22. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 276-77. Article V(1)(c)(i) of the Treaty
provides:
(1) Extradition shall not be granted if:
(c)(i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the re-
quested party as one of political character;...
Extradition Treaty, supra note 20. The court found that the killing of the British army
captain was the result of a gun battle between two armed military units in the course of
and in furtherance of the historic effort of the Irish to end British occupation of their
country. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 273. Note that under an amendment to the
extradition treaty, the political offense exception was subsequently eliminated. Supple-
mentary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, S. ExEc. REP. 17, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-2 (1986) [hereinafter Supplementary Extradition Treaty].
23. The government sought collateral review because the denial of a request for ex-
tradition is not appealable. Matter of Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). The dismissal
of this suit was affirmed on appeal, where the court held that "the government has not
cited, and we have not been able to find, a single case in which declaratory judgment was
used in a manner resembling that which the Government proposes here." United States
v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 500 (2d Cir. 1986).
24. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d at 206. Doherty conceded that he was deport-
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land as the destination of his deportation.25 On September 19,
1986, the immigration judge ordered Doherty's deportation to
the Republic of Ireland.2' The government appealed this order.27
Before the appeals were final, the Republic of Ireland signed an
extradition treaty with the United Kingdom. 28 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Doherty sought to rescind his request for deportation to Ire-
land and moved to reopen his deportation proceedings in order
to apply for political asylum in the United States.2 Doherty's
motion to reopen was ultimately denied in January 1992 by the
Supreme Court of the United States.30 He has since been de-
able because he had entered the United States without valid immigration documents.
Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. at 133. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1),
1182(a)(20)(1988).
25. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d at 206. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) objected to this designation on the ground that deporting him to Ireland
would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States. The INS received a continu-
ance so that it could consult with senior government officials. Id. See generally 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(a)(1988).
26. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d at 207. Immigration Judge Cohen rejected the
INS's arguments and ruled that Doherty's deportation to the Republic of Ireland would
not be prejudicial to the interests of the United States. Id. At this time Doherty filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the INS appeal of Judge Cohen's deci-
sion was frivolous and that the government was trying to delay the proceedings in the
hope that a new extradition treaty would be approved between the United States and
Great Britain which would eliminate the political offense exception retroactively. Id. See
also Brief for Appellee at 11-12, Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991)(No.
91-2044); Supplementary Extradition Treaty, supra note 22.
27. On March 11, 1987, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the BIA) affirmed Judge
Cohen's order. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d at 207. Upon request by the INS, the
then-Attorney General Edwin Meese III agreed to review the BIA's decision and in June
1988 reversed the BIA, finding that deportation to Ireland would be prejudicial to U.S.
interests. Id.
28. The Irish Extradition (European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism)
Act of 1987 (Dec. 1, 1987). Under its terms, Doherty's deportation to Ireland would be
the equivalent of his extradition to the United Kingdom.
29. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d at 207.
30. I.N.S. v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992). On November 14, 1988, the BIA granted
the motion to reopen, concluding that the 1987 Irish Extradition Act was a circumstance
that Doherty could not have been expected to anticipate, and would lead to his extradi-
tion to the United Kingdom, where he feared persecution. Id. at 723. Attorney General
Thornburgh reversed this decision after a request by the INS that the decision be certi-
fied by him. Doherty v. Thornburgh 943 F.2d at 207, 208. The Second Circuit, reviewing
Thornburgh's decision and Attorney General Meese's earlier denial of Doherty's deporta-
tion to Ireland, see supra note 25, affirmed the Meese order but reversed Thornburgh,
finding that he "exercised his discretion in denying Doherty's application for reasons
that Congress sought to eliminate from asylum cases, and in doing so, he abused his
discretion." Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, I.N.S., 908 F.2d 1108, 1121 (2d
Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that it "placed a
much too narrow limit on the authority of the Attorney General to deny a motion to
reopen deportation proceedings." I.N.S. v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 724.
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ported to the United Kingdom.31
While the extradition and deportation issues were being liti-
gated, Doherty sought to be released on bail. The judge in the
extradition proceedings initially denied Doherty's application for
bail based on risk of flight.2 Over a year later, however, an im-
migration judge ordered that he be released on a $200,000 bond
but the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed
and received an emergency stay of the decision.33 In March 1985,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered that Doherty
be held without bail.3 4 After Doherty's application for redetermi-
nation of bond was denied by the BIA in 1990,3' Doherty filed
this action seeking habeas review of the decision.
B. Procedural History
While seeking review of the BIA decision affirming the de-
nial of his application for redetermination of bond,3 Doherty
filed a petition for habeas corpus with the federal district court
of the Southern District of New York.3 7 He argued that the un-
usual length of his confinement violated his substantive due pro-
cess rights under the Fifth Amendment s.3  He also asserted that
the three-part test used by the Second Circuit to examine limits
on pretrial detention in United States v. Gonzales Claudio39
should be applied to his case.40 Finally, he claimed that, even if
31. IRA Ex-Member Doherty Loses 10-Year Battle on Deportation, WASH. POST,
Feb. 20, 1992, at A5.
32. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d at 206.
33. Id.
34. Id. The BIA found that Doherty presented "such a poor bail risk that no
amount of bond [would] reasonably assure his presence for future proceedings." Id.
35. Id. at 208.
36. The BIA found that "a substantial portion of the period of [Doherty's] deten-
tion" was attributable to his litigation strategy and that no bond conditions could ensure
Doherty's availability for deportation because he continued to present such a great risk
of flight. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. 131, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), af'd, 943 F. 2d
204 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992). In rejecting the due process
claim, the BIA found Gonzales Claudio, infra note 39, "unpersuasive authority as they
are criminal cases and relate to pretrial detention." In re Doherty, BIA File No.
A26185231 (BIA March 29, 1990) (quoted in Brief for Appellees at 19, Doherty v. Thorn-
burgh, 943 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 91-2044), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992)).
37. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d at 208.
38. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. at 131.
39. 806 F.2d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 978 (1986). See infra notes 59-
77 and accompanying text.
40. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. at 136. In the three-part test announced in
Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d at 340, the length of confinement is considered together with
the extent to which the government bears responsibility for delays in the proceedings
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the length of his confinement by itself was constitutional, his
continued detention violated due process protection under the
Gonzales Claudio test.
41
The district court ruled that Gonzales Claudio was inappo-
site.42 It distinguished detention pending deportation from de-
tention pending criminal proceedings by "the absence of a pre-
sumption of innocence in deportation proceedings and the
inapplicability of the constitutional and statutory rights to a
speedy trial.' 43 The court concluded that Doherty's detention
was constitutional, although it added in dictum that if detention
"ceases to serve the Government's legitimate regulatory purpose,
continued detention becomes punitive and unconstitutional."
4
4
On appeal, Doherty argued that Gonzales Claudio was con-
trolling and thus required the conclusion that inordinately long
pre-deportation detention is unconstitutional.45 The Second Cir-
cuit rejected Doherty's argument that Gonzales Claudio applied
to his case and affirmed the decision of the district court.'6
While the Second Circuit noted that "aliens do have a substan-
tive due process right to be free of arbitrary confinement pend-
ing deportation proceedings," the court concluded that this right
is "circumscribed by considerations of the national interest.'
4
In analyzing the circumstances surrounding Doherty's de-
tention, the Second Circuit focused on the discretion of the At-
torney General, in whom Congress has vested broad power re-
and the strength of the evidence of risk of flight. See infra notes 59-77 and accompany-
ing text.
41. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. at 136.
42. Id.
43. Id. The court relied upon Dor v. District Director, I.N.S., 891 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d
Cir. 1989), which held that Gonzales Claudio was controlling only for criminal defend-
ants detained for a prolonged period without bail before any trial. See infra notes 82-89
and accompanying text.
Despite rejecting Gonzales Claudio, the court proceeded to apply the test anyway to
demonstrate the constitutionality of Doherty's detention were the test applicable to de-
portable aliens: "The strength of the evidence of risk of flight, combined with peti-
tioner's failure to establish that the Government has improperly delayed deportation
proceedings, shows that petitioner's detention continues to serve the valid regulatory
purpose of keeping him available for deportation." Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp.
at 139.
44. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. at 137.
45. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112 S.
Ct. 1254 (1992).
46. Id. In the course of its analysis, the court, however, addressed each of the factors
that were rejected with the Gonzales Claudio test. Id.
47. Id.
1992]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
garding a deportable alien's detention.48 The court found that
"[b]ecause the infringement upon Doherty's liberty interest re-
sults from a proper exercise of discretion[,J . . . the prolonged
detention in this case is not conduct that goes beyond the range
of government activity permitted by the Constitution. '4 The
court noted the government's interests in carrying out its re-
sponsibilities over immigration matters and Doherty's threat to
national security as factors which supported the Attorney Gen-
eral's broad use of discretion. In justifying its conclusion, the
court also analyzed the causes of Doherty's lengthy detention,
finding that Doherty had been largely at fault for the delays in
litigation and that he had not demonstrated "the invidious pur-
pose, bad faith or arbitrariness [on the part of the government]
necessary to make out a denial of substantive due process."
1
The dissent argued that "[i]t is fundamental to our concep-
tion of liberty that an individual who is not accused or convicted
of a crime in this country may not be held indefinitely by the
State, regardless of his or her immigration status. '52 Relying on
the fairness principle that the Due Process Clause was designed
to protect, the dissent found it 9hocking that the court was al-
lowing "the government to indefinitely pursue a litigation strat-
egy, which was essentially designed to circumvent an extradition
decision, at the expense of an individual's right to liberty.
'5 3
III. ANALYSIS
Joseph Doherty's eight-year detention highlights the need
for a principled substantive due process analysis of the constitu-
tional rights afforded to aliens in deportation cases. Substantive
due process derives from the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that
48. Id. at 210.
49. Id. at 211.
50. Id. The court based its finding that Doherty posed a general threat to national
security on his PIRA affiliation. See also Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, 775
F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Given Doherty's overseas activities, the FBI could reasona-
bly have concluded that Doherty constituted a threat to national security."). Note, how-
ever, that Doherty's application for bond was denied solely on the grounds of his risk of
flight and the issue of his danger to society was not before the court. See supra note 32
and accompanying text; Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d
204 (2d Cir. 1991)(No. 91-2044), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
51. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112 S.
Ct. 1254 (1992).




"[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." '54 It has been interpreted as "pre-
vent[ing] the government from engaging in conduct that 'shocks
the conscience,' or interfer[ing] with rights 'implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty.' 55 One situation where this constitu-
tional protection has been invoked is when the government de-
tains an individual for a lengthy period without any criminal
conviction. 6
While pretrial detention has been considered a permissible
government regulatory measure, 1 many courts have recognized
that at some point the length of such detention unjustly im-
pinges upon an individual's constitutional rights.58 Detention
pending deportation is an analogous example of the government
detaining an individual who has not been convicted of a crime as
a regulatory measure. Because detention pending deportation is
so similar to pretrial detention, Doherty's substantive due pro-
cess claim requires that his detention must also be balanced
against the constitutional protection of individual freedom. Only
when such a principled analysis is applied will the constitutional
rights of deportable aliens be given their proper regard.
A. The Gonzales Claudio Test
In United States v. Gonzales Claudio, the Second Circuit
announced a test to be used in determining whether an individ-
ual's pretrial detention has exceeded its constitutional limits.59
While awaiting trial, the appellants 0 had been held without bail
54. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
55. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (quoting Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 978 (1986).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (holding that pretrial
detention is constitutional so long as the restriction on liberty does not constitute pun-
ishment as opposed to a permissible regulation).
58. See Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d at 339 ("The Government does not dispute that
at some point and under some circumstances, the duration of pretrial detention becomes
unconstitutional."); United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 547 (1st Cir. 1986); United
States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1008 (2d Cir. 1986)(Feinberg, C.J., concur-
ring); United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1516 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v.
LoFranco, 620 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), appeal sub nom. United States v. Cheese-
man, 783 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986).
59. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d at 340-43.
60. Appellants had been indicted for the robbery of a bank. The district court found
that they were salaried members of a paramilitary, terrorist organization dedicated to
achieving independence for Puerto Rico. Responsibility for the robbery had been
1992]
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for fourteen months based on the risk of their flight.6 1 The court
found their detention unconstitutional because the risk of their
flight was outweighed by the length of their detention and the
government's responsibility for the delay.2 By developing a test
which inquires into the length of detention, the government's re-
sponsibility for delay, and the defendants' risk of flight, the
court provided a proper balance between the government's inter-
est in efficiently enforcing its laws against the individual's lib-
erty interest.63
In announcing its test, the court stated that the due process
limit on the duration of preventive detention must be assessed
on a case-by-case basis. 4 The length of an individual's detention
was found to be the central focus of the court's substantive due
process inquiry."' However, the court reasoned that a proper due
process analysis requires additional factors to be considered,
even though "at some point the length of confinement would ex-
ceed constitutional limits regardless of the circumstances." 6
Thus, the court found it "more consonant with due process ju-
risprudence" to also consider the extent to which the govern-
ment bears responsibility for the delay that has ensued and the
strength of the evidence indicating risk of flight.
67
The court first inquired into the duration of the defendants'
confinement. Using the statutory period specified in the Speedy
Trial Act6 as a point of reference, the court compared the de-
claimed by this organization. Id. at 336-37.
61. Id. at 335. The court did not reach the issue of the proper substantive due pro-
cess analysis for when an individual has been detained on the ground of dangerousness.
In a related case also involving appellants, the concurring judge wrote that detention
lasting eight months was unconstitutional punishment when based on the ground of dan-
gerousness, but was within constitutional limits when based on the risk of flight.
Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1009 (Feinberg, J., concurring).
Doherty has also been detained solely on risk of flight grounds. Doherty v. Thorn-
burgh, 943 F.2d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992). The issue
of the constitutionality of the detention of a deportable alien based on dangerousness
will have to wait until it is before the courts.
62. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d at 343.
63. Id.




68. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b)(1988). The statute provides: "The trial of [pretrial detainees
and persons who have been designated as being of high risk] shall commence not later
than ninety days following the beginning of such continuous detention or designation of
high risk by the attorney for the Government." Id.
854 - [Vol. XVIII:3
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fendants' fourteen month incarceration with Congress' specified
preference for a detainee's trial to begin within ninety days after
the start of his detention.6 9 The court found that "[d]etention
that has lasted for fourteen months and, without speculation, is
scheduled to last considerably longer, points strongly to a denial
of due process.
'7 0
The Second Circuit also inquired into the extent to which
the government bore responsibility for the length of defendants'
confinement. Noting the complexity of the case and volume of
evidentiary material, the court concluded that the prosecution
was responsible for a significant amount of the delay because of
its failure to expeditiously provide the materials requested by
the defendants' counsel.7 1 A determination of the precise
amount of delay attributable to the government was not impor-
tant to the court's inquiry.
72
Finally, the court analyzed the danger that the defendants
would not appear for their trial. The court found that a standard
of appellate review broader than the customary "clearly errone-
ous" standard was appropriate for this type of constitutional in-
quiry.7 3 Thus, when analyzing the constitutionality of pretrial
detention, the absence of any prior acts which specifically indi-
cate a likelihood that the defendant will flee would be signifi-
cant. 4 Because there had been no specific finding of any prior
acts which were evidence of defendants' risk of flight, the risk
was determined to be insufficient to justify continued detention
in light of the length of the detention and the government's re-
sponsibility for the delay. 5
69. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2"d at 340-41.
70. Id. at 341.
71. Id. at 342. For example, the government's translation of the audiotapes obtained
by its wiretapping was not completed until nine months after defendants were incarcer-
ated. Additionally, the translation of seized documents took more than a year and the
existence of videotapes was not made known to defendants until ten months after their
detention began. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 343. In United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986), a
companion case to Gonzales Claudio involving the same defendants and others, the
court had applied the clearly erroneous standard normally used by the court in its appel-
late function to the district judge's risk of flight determination in upholding his factual
finding. In Gonzales Claudio, however, the court determined that the constitutional in-
quiry entitled it to a broader standard of review. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d at 343. See
also United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 546 (1st Cir. 1986).
74. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d at 343.
75. Id. The court noted that the evidence which served as the basis for the district
court's decision, that defendants were involved with armed robbery and with a terrorist
1992] 855
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
Finally, the court acknowledged that "the enforcement of
due process limits upon the duration of preventative detention
creates the risk that a person accused of a crime may avoid a
trial that might result in conviction and punishment. 7' How-
ever, finding that this serious risk was outweighed by the
lengthy detention of defendants who had not yet been convicted
of a crime, the court vacated the detention order of the district
court.1
7
In United States v. Ojeda Rios, 8 the Second Circuit later
clarified the reach of the Gonzales Claudio test by finding the
appellant's 32 month pretrial detention to be unconstitutional.7 9
The court concluded that even with strong evidence of appel-
lant's risk of flight, detention which was so lengthy and would
not be ending soon could not be tolerated under the Due Process
Clause.80 Thus, Ojeda Rios indicated that with increasingly
longer periods of pretrial detention the risk of flight by the de-
tainees becomes less important.81
B. The Dor Decision
In Dor v. District Director,2 the Second Circuit determined
that the Gonzales Claudio analysis did not apply in determining
the constitutionality of the detention of deportable aliens. In
Dor, petitioner was a citizen of Haiti, who entered the United
States at the age of twelve and was convicted of manslaughter
six years later.83 After serving his prison sentence, he was re-
leased into the custody of the INS, where he remained during
organization, provided a reasonable basis for its initial decision. Id.
76. Id. In reaching this conclusion the court noted that "the enforcement of all con-
stitutional restraints upon government in its efforts to administer the criminal law en-
tails risks." Id.
77. Id.
78. 846 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1988). This case involved another individual allegedly in-
volved in the same bank robbery as the defendants in Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d at 334.
Ojeda Rios had been held without bail on the grounds of both dangerousness and risk of
flight. Ojeda Rios, 846 F.2d at 168.
79. Ojeda Rios, 846 F.2d at 168-69.
80. Id.
81. The Second Circuit has revisited the Gonzales Claudio test in another related
case involving defendants who were accused of being part of the same bank robbery. In
United States v. Melendez-Carrion, the court found that appellants' nineteen month de-
tention did not violate their due process rights due mainly to the strong evidence of their
risk of flight. 820 F.2d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1988).
82. 891 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1989).
83. Id. at 999.
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his fight against deportation. 4 In reviewing the district court's
denial of habeas corpus relief, the Second Circuit rejected Dor's
argument that his continued detention of more than five years
was a denial of due process.8 5 After finding Gonzales Claudio
inapplicable, the court determined that Dor's own responsibility
for the delay in his detention was the dispositive factor in his
due process claim. 6 By focusing on Dor's exhaustion of his judi-
cial remedies, the court in fact applied part of the analysis that
it had previously rejected in distinguishing Gonzales Claudio.
8
7
Ultimately, the Second Circuit rejected the Gonzales Clau-
dio analysis in Dor because it distinguished the Gonzales Clau-
dio detention as criminal in nature." The court erred in reach-
ing that conclusion. There is no reason to discard the
constitutional analysis used in Gonzales Claudio solely because
of the distinction between a criminal pretrial detainee and a de-
portable alien. In the past, courts have found the similarities be-
tween the two types of detention to be quite useful because both
are temporary, regulatory procedures that serve to enable the
government to carry out its laws.89
Though the distinction made in Dor was based on the find-
ing that "the full trappings of legal protections that are accorded
to criminal defendants are not necessarily constitutionally re-
quired in deportation proceedings,"9 " the court could not have
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1003.
86. Id. The court characterized Dor's responsibility for the delay as "repeated, un-
successful appeals of various administrative decisions." Id.
87. The court proceeded to quote Gonzales Claudio after rejecting it in the previous
paragraph. The court wrote: "[Don] comes perilously close to Gonzales Claudio's admo-
nition that '[parties] cannot litigate pretrial matters to the ultimate degree and then rely
on the extra time attributable to their. . . practice to claim that the duration of pretrial
detention violates due process.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806
F.2d 334, 341 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 978 (1986)).
88. Id. at 1003.
89. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir.
1981) ("Detention pending deportation seems properly analogized to incarceration pend-
ing trial."); Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 507 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[W]e find
the analogy to pretrial detention appropriate, at least for the purposes of defining the
proper scope of inquiry.").
90. Dor v. District Director, I.N.S., 891 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1989). In the district
court's opinion in Doherty, Gonzales Claudio was found not to be controlling in the
deportation context "because of the absence of a presumption of innocence in deporta-
tion proceedings and the inapplicability of the constitutional and statutory rights to a
speedy trial." Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. 131, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 943
F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992). This distinction is inde-
terminate considering that "presumption of innocence" and "speedy trial" rights are
19921
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meant that the Fifth Amendment is not equally applicable to
deportable aliens. The Constitution does not supply a different
degree of due process protection to different categories of per-
sons;9 '1 such distinctions simply do not appear in its text. More-
over, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment
as applicable to deportable aliens.2
With no sound reasoning behind the distinction made in
Dor, the analysis of an alien's substantive due process claim re-
quires the same analysis that would be used for a citizen. Al-
though the government has an additional interest when an indi-
vidual is detained in the context of immigration proceedings,93
this distinction may be accommodated by simply incorporating
this additional interest - deference for foreign policy - into
the Gonzales Claudio balancing test. There is no reason to aban-
don the principled inquiry into the factors that were enunciated
in Gonzales Claudio simply because of the citizenship and im-
migration status of the individual being detained.
C. Elements of Gonzales Claudio in Immigration Case Law
In those few cases in which the substantive due process
rights of aliens in detention have been analyzed, the courts have
inquired into factors similar to those used for pretrial detainees
in Gonzales Claudio. Without relying on any enunciated test
that is comparable to that of the Second Circuit, federal courts
have still found the length of the alien's detention, the responsi-
bility for the delay, and the risk of flight to be within the proper
scope of their inquiry. That the same factors have been used by
other courts in the due process analysis of such cases suggests
that the Second Circuit improperly rejected the Gonzales Clau-
dio test in Dor and Doherty v. Thornburgh.
The challenges to the prolonged detention of the Mariel
solely procedural. The challenge to the detention in this case, however, is substantive.
The implication that these procedural rights are necessary in order for the Gonzales
Claudio analysis to apply leads to absurd results: if Doherty also had committed a crime,
then would he have had greater due process rights merely because he had the benefit of
the "presumption of innocence" and a "speedy trial"?
91. A person can be categorized as a citizen, or deportable, excludable, or resident
alien.
92. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) ("all persons within
the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by [the Fifth
A]mendment").
93. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
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Cubans94 provide an analogous context in which to explore the
proper analysis to be used for the detention of aliens such as
Joseph Doherty. 5 In Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson," a
case involving a Mariel Cuban detainee, the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the lengthy detention of aliens.
Even though the detainee in this case was an excludable alien,
the court noted that "detention pending deportation seems
properly analogized to incarceration pending trial or other dis-
position of a criminal charge, and is, thus, justifiable only as a
necessary, temporary measure. ' ' 97 The Tenth Circuit apparently
did not see the distinction that the Second Circuit found be-
94. In the spring of 1980, 125,000 Cuban immigrants sailed from Mariel Harbor in
Cuba to the shores of the United States in response to statements by the President of
the United States that the United States would receive "tens of thousands" of Cubans
with "an open heart and open arms." Mark D. Kemple, Legal Fictions Mask Human
Suffering: The Detention of the Mariel Cubans: -Constitutional, Statutory, Interna-
tional Law, and Human Considerations, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1733, 1735 (1989). Because
most of these aliens lacked proper entry documents, they were "excludable" under the
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1988) and
were thus denied formal admission to the United States. Kemple, supra, at 1736. While
the Act requires that the excluded aliens be returned to where they came from, Cuba
refused to take them back. The Attorney General, acting through the INS, detained the
aliens at camps Throughout the United States, and thereafter paroled many of them.
Kemple, supra, at 1736.
95. The court in Doherty v. Thornburgh noted the distinction between "excludable"
and "deportable" aliens, distinguishing Joseph Doherty from the Mariel Cubans, who
were excludable. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 208 n.1 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dis-
missed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992). An alien seeking admission into the United States has no
inherent right of entry and, therefore, does not receive the due process protection of
other individuals in the country. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 542 (1950). See also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (no
constitutional right to enter in substantive due process challenge).
Many argue that this distinction is a legal fiction, which gives certain aliens in the
United States less legal protection simply because they have not officially "entered" the
country, having been apprehended at the border. See Kemple, supra note 94, at 1735;
United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir. 1979) (no distinction can be drawn in
application of rules between an alien who is regarded as standing at the border and one
who is a resident of the United States).
- For the purposes of this analysis, the immigration status of the alien is irrelevant.
These cases merely point to the kind of factors to consider when a detainee is involved in
an immigration procedure. The test that is being developed, however, will only be appli-
cable to deportable aliens because the government has slightly different interests when
an alien is excludable, and the time frame in which an excludable alien is to be excluded
is different and governed by separate statutes. For an examination of the due process
rights of excludable aliens, see Ethan A. Klingsberg, Penetrating the Entry Doctrine:
Excludable Aliens' Constitutional Rights in Immigration Processes, 98 YALE L.J. 639
(1989).
96. 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
97. Id.
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tween detainees who are awaiting trial and those who are await-
ing deportation.
Rodriguez-Fernandez, like Doherty, had committed no of-
fense against the United States, yet he had been confined in a
maximum security federal prison for more than a year.9 8 How-
ever, because he had not yet entered the country, Rodriguez-
Fernandez was found excludable. 9 The Tenth Circuit nonethe-
less ordered his release, holding that the Attorney General
lacked the authority to detain excludable aliens beyond "a rea-
sonable period of negotiations for their return to the country of
origin or to the transporter that brought them here." 100
In analyzing Rodriguez-Fernandez's due process rights, 101
the court focused on the length of his detention, finding that
imprisonment for an indefinite period of time was impermissible
when it continued beyond reasonable efforts to expel the
alien.10 The court relied on precedent which established that
detention becomes imprisonment when deportable or excludable
aliens are in custody for more than a few months.10 3 The focus of
the court's constitutional inquiry was thus centered on the
length of the detention of an alien who was guilty of no crime in
the United States. In Rodriguez-Fernandez, that detention was
too long.
The First Circuit has looked at more than the length of de-
tention in analyzing the constitutional challenge to the deten-
tion of excludable aliens. In Amanullah v. Nelson,10 4 the court
found that the government's lack of responsibility for the delay
was dispositive of the constitutionality of the detention of four
Afghanistanis who were being detained by the INS pending final
resolution of the exclusion proceedings against them. 0 5 The
98. Id. at 1385.
99. Id. at 1384. His exclusion was based on his criminal record and lack of immigra-
tion documents. Id.
100. Id. at 1389.
101. The court disposed of the appeal by construing the exclusion statutes narrowly
to require Rodriguez-Fernandez's release, but found it important to address the constitu-
tional issues. Id. at 1386.
102. Id. at 1387.
103. See Petition of Brooks, 5 F.2d 238, 239 (D. Mass. 1925) ("There is no power in
this court or in any other tribunal in this country to hold indefinitely any sane citizen or
alien in imprisonment, except as punishment for a crime."). This case was decided before
the statutory limits placed upon the detention of aliens by the subsequent Immigration
and Nationality Acts.
104. 811 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
105. Id. at 9.
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court found that "there is no suggestion of unwarranted govern-
mental footdragging in these cases[,] prompt attention hav[ing]
been paid to the administrative aspects of exclusion and asy-
lum." Thus the discretionary detefition was found to be consti-
tutional because it "ha[d] not been unnecessarily prolonged."1 °
Acknowledging that the length of detention was also an impor-
tant factor to consider in this due process inquiry, the court dis-
tinguished Rodriguez-Fernandez because the Afghanistanis' ex-
clusion and asylum proceedings were still pending.
10
7
In Amanullah and Rodriguez-Fernandez, the courts ad-
dressed two elements of the test for pretrial detainees in analyz-
ing the constitutionality of lengthy detention in the immigration
context.108 While not explicated, the fear that the aliens might
never be deported is an additional, underlying consideration in
each of these cases which reflects a concern that aliens will ab-
scond upon release. 09 The approach these courts have taken in
their constitutional inquiries demonstrates the usefulness of the
Gonzales Claudio factors in the immigration context."10 Thus,
106. Id.
107. Id. While petitioners in Amanullah had also been detained for over a year, in
Rodriguez-Fernandez a final deportation order had already been entered against the
alien. Id. at 9 n.4.
108. Recall that in Dor v. District Director, discussed supra at notes 82-89 and ac-
companying text, the court relied upon appellant's significant responsibility for the delay
of his detention. 891 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1989).
109. See, e.g., Amanullah, 811 F.2d at 11 ("freeing [the Cubans] from detention
would . . . have created an ever-increasing law enforcement problem").
110. In the immigration context, a consideration of national security has also fac-
tored into the constitutionality of the detention of aliens. In Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207 (1953), for example, the confinement of an ex-
cluded alien on Ellis Island for twenty-one months was justified on the grounds that he
was excluded as a security risk. Justice Jackson dissented in this case but noted in his
constitutional analysis that "substantively, due process of law. . . tolerates all reasona-
ble measures to insure the national safety, and it leaves a large, at times a potentially
dangerous, latitude for executive judgment as to policies and means." Id. at 222 (Jack-
son, J., dissenting).
When an alien is detained as a threat to national security, the court may need to use
a different constitutional analysis than in the context of immigration. Since Gonzales
Claudio was decided, the Second Circuit has expressly limited the test to reviewing the
constitutionality of continued detention based on risk-of-flight grounds. United States v.
Melendez-Carrion, 820 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1987). In Doherty v. Thornburgh, dangerous-
ness was not the basis for detention. While the Second Circuit noted that Doherty "may
constitute a more general threat to national security," 943 F.2d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 1991),
cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992), his detention was based solely on his risk of flight
and the dangerousness issue was not before the court. When the issue arises, a proper
analysis will be developed factoring in the national security risk. The national security
risk discussed in Mezei, supra, was based on the fear of the spread of communism, an
element of the political climate at the time the case was decided. See 345 U.S. at 207.
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the Gonzales Claudio test should be applicable to all substan-
tive due process challenges to the incarceration of any individual
who has not been convicted of a crime.
D. A Gonzales Claudio Test for Immigration Matters
Once it has been determined that the framework of the
Gonzales Claudio test is appropriate for all constitutional chal-
lenges to prolonged government restraint, the analysis must be
tailored to fit the context of the particular detention. In the im-
migration context, the government has additional interests
which are absent from pretrial detention in criminal law.111 In
developing an analysis for detention in the immigration context,
the same factors prescribed in Gonzales Claudio will be used
and adjusted to take into account the additional government in-
terests involved.112
1. Aliens' Interests
Like all pretrial detainees, aliens have a liberty interest to
be free of prolonged restraint.1 The Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution makes no distinction between aliens and citizens in
protecting all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States from deprivation of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. 1 4 This protection even extends to those unlaw-
fully present in the United States.11 5 Thus, there is no difference
between the liberty interests of illegal aliens and United States
citizens.
The length of detention is a significant factor in considering
whether the substantive due process rights of a deportable alien
have been violated.116 While Congress has required that deporta-
tion be pursued "with such reasonable dispatch as may be war-
ranted by the particular facts and circumstances in the case of
111. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
112. The test must embody a proper balancing of the government's interest in im-
migration matters and the individual's liberty interest in determining whether an alien's
substantive due process rights have been violated.
113. See Fernandez-Santander v. Thornburgh, 751 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (D. Me.
1990), vacated and remanded, 930 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1991) ("alien has a strong interest
in liberty").
114. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). See also Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-
Grath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51 (1950); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
115. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77.
116. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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any alien,""' 7 the Attorney General has a statutorily defined six-
month period in which to effectuate the deportation of an alien
once a final judgment has been rendered." s Thus, the longer the
delay in the alien's receipt of a final judgment, the greater the
deprivation of liberty.
With a statutory limit on the amount of time an alien may
be held, the detention can only be prolonged as a result of ap-
peals or delay caused by either the government or the alien.
Thus, in analyzing a lengthy detention, it is important to note
the extent to which the alien is responsible for her own contin-
ued detention." 9 For example, if lengthy detention is the result
of an alien's repeated use of appellate review to avoid deporta-
tion, then it is less likely that the government will be found to
have deprived the detainee of her liberty in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.
2 0
In giving weight to a deportable alien's liberty interest, the
length of the detention and the responsibility for the delay are
within the proper scope of inquiry just as they are in the Gonza-
les Claudio context of pretrial detention. A principled constitu-
tional analysis must also give sufficient weight to the govern-
ment's interests.
2. The Government's Interests
An alien's right to liberty during the course of deportation
proceedings must be circumscribed by the relevant interests of
the government. 12' While all individuals in the United States are
protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, a de-
portable alien does not receive the same degree of protection as
an American citizen because the weight of the government's in-
117. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1), 1252(c) (1988).
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c)(1988). See supra note 5 for text of statute. Once the six
months have passed, the alien must be released until the INS can execute the deporta-
tion. See Dalis v. Brady, 766 F. Supp. 901, 905 (D. Colo. 1991); Castillo-Gradis v.
Turnage, 752 F. Supp. 937, 941 (S.D. Ca. 1990).
Congress' unspecified limit on detention prior to a final judgment of deportation
provides a difficult point of reference for judging the excessiveness of the detention.
Compare the use of the Speedy Trial Act as a point of reference for pretrial detainees in
United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 340-41 (2d Cir. 1986). See supra notes
68-70 and accompanying text.
119. See Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d at 340.
120. See, e.g., Dor v. District Director, 891 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1989).
121. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112
S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
1992]
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terests is heightened in the immigration context. 122 By scrutiniz-
ing the government's interests in detaining an alien the court
clarifies the degree to which an alien's liberty interest may be
qualified.
It is well established that control over matters of immigra-
tion and naturalization is the "inherent and inalienable right of
every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety,
its independence and its welfare."12 Under the United States
Constitution, such control over the borders is vested in Con-
gress. 124 Congress has charged the Attorney General with "the
administration and enforcement" of the immigration laws of the
United States,1 25 and specifically has vested in that office the
discretion to detain aliens during deportation proceedings.1 26
Holding an alien in detention without bail is only justified, how-
ever, when it is in the public interest 27 or if the alien is likely to
abscond.12
Thus, a primary purpose of detention is to ensure that the
alien will be available if he or she is determined to be deport-
able.1 29 While the traditional threat of flight130 is not a concern
in the context of immigration since expulsion is exactly what is
sought by the government, the threat remains that an alien sub-
122. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-90 (1952).
123. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893).
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
125. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988).
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), (c) (1988). The Attorney General has delegated this power
to the INS. See United States ex rel. Barbour v. District Attorney, 491 F.2d 573, 577 n.4
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); O'Rourke v. Warden, 539 F. Supp. 1131,
1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
127. In carrying out the immigration laws of the United States, it is well established
that the government has the power to detain an alien on grounds of national security.
See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) ("Detention is necessarily a part of th[e]
deportation procedure. Otherwise aliens arrested for deportation would have opportuni-
ties to hurt the United States during the pendency of deportation proceedings."). Con-
gress has recognized thai any hostility on the part of individuals in the United States
towards a friendly nation may threaten national security even though individual Ameri-
can citizens are not directly injured. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 951-962 (1988). Detention on the
basis of national security is not involved in these cases.
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1988). See also Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BEWrWN STATES 229 (1978).
129. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); Leader v. Blackman,
744 F. Supp. 500, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
130. Under The Ball Reform Act of 1984, "[the judicial officer shall order the pre-
trial release of the person ... unless the judicial officer determines that such release will
not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required . . " 18 U.S.C. §
3142(b) (1988).
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ject to deportation will abscond. 131 By denying bail, the govern-
ment is preserving its ability to carry out its responsibilities over
immigration matters. 132 This interest parallels the government's
interest in enforcing its criminal laws through pretrial detention.
Therefore, the risk-of-flight prong of the Gonzales Claudio test
is equally appropriate in the immigration context as a means of
balancing the government's interests in enforcing its laws and
specifically in executing deportation. 33
The federal government has an additional interest, however,
in detaining a deportable alien which is not present in pretrial
detention. In the immigration context, the government's deci-
sion whether to detain or release an individual may have a direct
impact on the nation's foreign policy."3 For example, as in Do-
herty's case, where an alien has escaped punishment for a crime
committed in a friendly foreign nation, there are political con-
cerns involved which reflect the United States' relations with the
United Kingdom. 3 The implications of the release of a pretrial
detainee who is a United States citizen, on the other hand, will
not affect the United States' relations with foreign govern-
ments. 3 ' In the immigration context, therefore, more deference
must be given to the government's bail decision in light of its
special role in matters of foreign policy.
37
131. Leader, 744 F. Supp. at 507.
132. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112
S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
133. Up to this point, all the interests involved in the detention of a deportable
alien have been parallel to the interests involved in pretrial detention; thus, each ele-
ment of the Gonzales Claudio test has been found to be relevant in the immigration
context. At this point, however, one more element of the government's interests must be
taken into account which is not present in the analysis of pretrial detention.
134. See I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988) ("I.N.S. officials must exercise
especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations");
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) ("[A]ny policy toward aliens is
vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the con-
duct of foreign relations.").
135. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee, Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.
1991) (No. 91-2044), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
136. This is the point that distinguishes Doherty v. Thornburgh from Gonzales
Claudio. Both cases involved alleged members of terrorist organizations who were being
detained while they were involved in legal proceedings. However, in Doherty, there were
international repercussions present in the release of Joseph Doherty. Domestically, the
release of Doherty is just as risky as the release of Gonzales Claudio.
137. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) ("Since decisions in [immigration]
matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers . . .such decisions are fre-
quently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than
to the Judiciary."); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 589 ("[Foreign relations] are so exclusively
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By using the Gonzales Claudio test to analyze the constitu-
tionality of detention in the context of immigration, the same
risk-of-flight concerns of the government are sufficiently repre-
sented. The government's additional interest in foreign policy is
the only factor absent from the analysis used for pretrial detain-
ees and may weigh against the release of the alien. 13 8 Therefore
the Gonzales Claudio test must be adjusted only slightly to ac-
comodate the deference given to the government's decision to
detain the alien in light of its greater interests in the immigra-
tion context. 39
E. Applying the Test to Doherty
A proper constitutional analysis of Doherty's detention re-
quires the application of a modified Gonzales Claudio analysis
that responds to. the immigration law context rather than the
Second Circuit's cursory assessment of the discretion exercised
by the Attorney General. As in the test used for pretrial deten-
tion, a court must inquire into the 16ngth of the alien's deten-
tion, the government's responsibility for delay, and the likeli-
hood that the alien will abscond. Additionally, a court has to
consider the government's foreign policy interest and may afford
greater weight and deference to the government's decision than
it would in the context of pretrial detention.
Looking first at the length of Joseph Doherty's detention -
the prime indicator of the infringement on his liberty interest'4 °
- it is clear that his confinement for over eight years is exces-
sive. Aside from the Mariel Cubans,' 4 ' Mr. Doherty has been
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial
inquiry or interference.").
138. This should not be given so much weight as to render the rest of the analysis
meaningless. The whole premise of having a principled constitutional analysis is to avoid
the presence of unfettered governmental discretion solely because the people being de-
tained are not U.S. citizens.
139. This inquiry may have to be very fact-specific. While it is not the courts' job to
second-guess foreign policy decisions of the executive branch of the government, it does
not seem appropriate for the Attorney General to rely on the foreign policy prong of the
test in cases where it seems unlikely that release will arise to an international affront to
another government.
140. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
141. Besides being distinguishable because of their status as excludable aliens, see
supra note 95, the Mariel Cubans are also distinguishable because they had never con-
sented to deportation. Doherty, on the other hand, consented to deportation at one




held longer than any individual in either a federal criminal pro-
ceeding or in a deportation proceeding. 142 Though the district
court recognized that "no case has come to [its] attention in
which a deportable alien has been in custody as long as Do-
herty,1 4 3 it assessed the length of detention by comparison to
the Second Circuit's acceptance of the five-year detention in Dor
v. District Director.4 4 Without even inquiring into the factual
difference between the two cases, the court found Doherty's
three extra years of detention to be of little or no consequence.
The length of Doherty's detention should also be compared
to the statutory limit on the detention of deportable aliens pre-
scribed by Congress. 45 While the district court dismissed the ar-
gument that eight years of detention is a far cry from the statu-
torily prescribed six-month limit within which the Attorney
General must deport an alien after the entry of a final order of
deportation, 46 the six-month figure is indicative of Congress'
judgment of a reasonable time within which a deportation
should be effectuated. Finally, as suggested by Gonzales Clau-
dio, the fact that Doherty's detention is scheduled to last consid-
erably longer also "points strongly to a denial of due process.' ' 47
Doherty's undeniably lengthy detention, however, must still be
considered in light of the other important factors.
It is difficult to assess the government's responsibility for
delay in lengthy and complex litigation such as Doherty's. The
district court attempted to divide up the periods of detention
according to who was responsible for the delay during each pe-
142. See, e.g., Dor v. District Director, 891 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1989) (five years);
United States v. Ojeda-Rios, 846 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1988) (thirty-two months); United
States v. Melendez Carrion, 820 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1987) (nineteen months); United States
v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1986) (fourteen months).
143. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. 131, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), afl'd, 943 F.2d
204 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
144. Id. at 137. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
146. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. at 137. The court stated that "Congress
did not specify a specific time limit for detention pending deportation." Id. After quoting
the statute's "reasonable dispatch" language, see supra notes 117-18 and accompanying
text, and relegating the six-month limit to a footnote, the court does not even bother to
proceed with any sort of analysis of the length of time. Id. Was the court suggesting that
there are no limits on the Attorney General's obligation to pursue deportation with
"such reasonable dispatch?"
147. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. The length of detention can be
analyzed in the same way as in Gonzales Claudio because there is no difference in the
liberty interests. Only the government's interests are different in the immigration con-
text. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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riod.14s Though this analysis was affirmed by the Second Cir-
cuit,1'4 9 a more realistic conclusion was articulated by Judge Al-
timari in his dissent:
"Both the government and Doherty point an accusing finger at
the other as they assess blame for the length of Doherty's in-
carceration. After eight years, the parallel rights so freely
granted have become so intertwined that we are unable to con-
clude whether one party or another is responsible for the ex-
tended confinement. This cannot mean, however, that so long
as the parties in the context of this case assert their respective
rights in good faith - which necessarily results in delay - the
initial detention may be continued ad infinitum." 150
This conclusion appears to present the fairest interpretation of
this protracted litigation. When two parties are equally exercis-
ing their rights to achieve a certain result, it is unfair to find
only one of these parties blameworthy for its actions. 51 Thus,
When neither or both of the parties are deemed to be blamewor-
thy for the delay, the inquiry is moot.
The government's strongest argument for the continued de-
tention of Doherty was the risk that he would abscond. The dis-
trict court concluded that "it is difficult to imagine circum-
stances which would present a greater likelihood that petitioner,
148. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. at 138-39. After a lengthy analysis which
addresses each delay in the proceedings, the court concluded:
With the possible exception of the two-month period during which the Govern-
ment sought reconsideration from the BIA because the Government's evidence
had been inadvertently delayed, the periods which petitioner seeks to attribute
to the Government were not due to failures to perform required obligations.
Instead, the time periods cited were devoted to the argument and considera-
tion of the difficult legal issues presented by petitioner's case.
Id. at 139.
149. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112
S. Ct. 1254 (1992). The Court of Appeals also made its own inquiry, finding Doherty
primarily responsible. The court hinted that, in order for the government to be responsi-
ble for delay, there must be some "invidious purpose, bad faith, or arbitrariness" to be
found on its part. Id. This suggests that the government may exhaust all judicial
processes to achieve its goal without being blamed for delay, but an alien risks being
blamed for delay by doing the exact same thing.
150. Id. at 214 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
151. This situation should be compared to Dor v. District Director, 891 F.2d 997 (2d
Cir. 1989), in which petitioner remained in detention for over five years after his final
order of deportation had been issued solely because of his repeated, unsuccessful appeals
of various decisions against him. The court found that "Dor's continued presence in the
United States, and his sustained detention, result[ed] from the simple fact that - at his
urgent request and by [the court's] stay - [it] allowed his application to be exhaustively
adjudicated by the I.N.S." Id. at 1003.
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if released, would abscond and not surrender for deportation.' 52
While the district court found that Doherty presented a serious
bail risk, these risks should have been accepted "to avoid uncon-
scionable deprivations of the liberty of individuals."'153 There is
always a risk inherent in the release of any individual on bail
which at some point must be outweighed by the protection of
the Constitution.
In a due process analysis, an appellate court is entitled to a
broad standard of review of the District Court's risk-of-flight de-
termination. 154 However, the Second Circuit gave no weight to
the evidence supporting Doherty's ties to the community - the
$800,000 bail package that was organized on his behalf and the
broad public and personal support that he had achieved in this
country.155 In addition, the court failed to explore other condi-
tions of parole, such as a larger bail amount or an electronic
bracelet. 5 1 Thus, the cursory consideration given by the district
court to Doherty's community ties and other conditions of pa-
role illustrated the court's unwillingness to seriously consider
the alien's substantive due process rights. With a broader stan-
dard of review, the appellate court could have considered the
factors which were omitted from the lower court's analysis. Ad-
ditionally, the Second Circuit has implied that the risk of flight
determination should be given less weight as the passage of time
of an individual's detention increases. 57 Thus, in light of Do-
herty's community ties, large bail package, and unusually long
detention, the lower court's risk of flight determination should
not have been afforded such great weight.
152. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. at 139.
153. United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 343 (2d Cir. 1986).
154. Id. See also supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
155. Doherty had established several close friends since he had been in the United
States, who had submitted affidavits in support of his application for release on bond,
attesting to his good character and pledging their assets to secure his bond. Brief for
Appellant at 22, Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991) (No 91-2044), cert.
dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992). Doherty was also visited personally by the Archbishop
of New York, United States Senators and Representatives, the Reverend Jesse Jackson,
and other influential people who had offered nothing but support to the detainee. Id. at
24-28
156. See, e.g., United States v. Ojeda Rios, 846 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting
appellant's willingness to abide by any conditions imposed upon his release from confine-
ment, "including a prohibition against leaving [the area], daily reporting to an appropri-
ate government official and the use of a radio bracelet warning system."). This was men-
tioned in Doherty's case in the oral argument before the Court of Appeals but was not
addressed in the opinion.
157. See Ojeda Rios, 846 F.2d at 169. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
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Finally, special consideration must be given in the immigra-
tion context to the government's control over foreign policy. 158
The government claims that "where an alien's flight would affect
the nation's foreign policy, the risks ordinarily associated with
granting bail are magnified."'1 59 While it is easy for a court to
give deference to the Attorney General's decision to detain,
there must be a point at which the individual's liberty interest
will exceed the speculative nature of the effect that the release
will have on the United States' relations with Great Britain. The
United Kingdom could not expect the United States to act
outside the bounds of its Constitution simply because their ex-
tradition treaty failed to provide a means for Doherty's deporta-
tion and had not yet been amended with the removal of the po-
litical offense exception.160
Recognizing the seriousness of an individual's liberty inter-
est, "the Due Process Clause endeavors to set outer limits at
which risks to society must be accepted to avoid unconscionable
deprivations of . . . liberty."'' Such a limit must have been
reached in this case. If Doherty's substantive due process rights
have not been violated at this point, it is doubtful that they
would ever be violated. 62 By holding that Doherty could law-
fully be detained for over eight years without having been ac-
cused of a crime in the United States, the court set a dangerous
precedent which may stand for the proposition that an individ-
ual's liberty interest will at no point exceed the foreign policy
concerns of the government. The Constitution does not allow
such a principle to exist. It is undeniable that at some point Do-
herty's detention constitutes impermissible punishment rather
than permissible regulation. 63 A detainee may not be punished
prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process
of law.
6 4
Because the length of Doherty's detention had been so ex-
tensive and no significant blame could be attributed to Doherty
or the government for each day of detention, these factors out-
158. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
159. Brief for Appellee at 35, Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991)
(No. 91-2044), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
160. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
161. United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 343 (2d Cir. 1986).
162. For example, how much different would the analysis be three years later?
163. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987).
164. White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1504 (9th Cir. 1990).
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weighed the risk of Doherty's flight and the government's inter-
est in immigration and foreign policy. The point had been
reached where his detention exceeded that which is constitution-
ally permissible despite the nature of his political affiliation and
the government's strong interest in his continued detention. By
avoiding an enunciated constitutional analysis, the Second Cir-
cuit revealed its unwillingness to seriously consider the substan-
tive due process rights of Joseph Doherty.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Doherty v. Thornburgh, the Second Circuit attributed
undue weight to the government's strong desire not to release
Doherty on bail while his various judicial proceedings were being
litigated. The Constitution requires that at some point the indi-
vidual's interest in liberty must outweigh the government's in-
terests in detaining a deportable alien. A principled constitu-
tional analysis would determine the constitutionality of such
detention by weighing the length of the detention against the
government's responsibility for the delay and the risk that the
alien will abscond. This determination should be made in light
of the government's strong interest in foreign policy. In order to
give this test any meaning, it must be used as a real determina-
tion of an alien's constitutional rights rather than having the
courts defer to the discretion of the Attorney General. In the
case of Joseph Doherty, eight years of detention was unjustifi-
able and violated his substantive due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Michael H. Williams
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